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Abstract 
 
By combining our broad panel survey of Japanese adults from 2005 to 2008 and actual cigarette tax data, 
we investigate how smoking behavior including responses to tax hikes depends on time discounting and its 
biases, such as hyperbolic discounting and the sign effect. Cigarette consumption displays significantly 
positive correlations with discount rates and the procrastinating tendency, and negative correlations with 
the sign effect. Hyperbolic, procrastinating, and naïve respondents decrease their after-tax-hike cigarette 
consumption more than the others, implying that, irrespective of the preannouncement of a future tax hike, 
they postpone smoking moderation until the tax hike actually takes place. Finally, the government’s 
revenue from cigarette tax peaks at a JPY 29.92 (around USD 0.28 using the conversion rate [107.16] in 
February 2008) higher tax per cigarette than the present actual level.  
 
Keywords: smoking, cigarette tax, time preference, discount rate, hyperbolic discounting, procrastination, 
the sign effect 
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1. Introduction 
 
By analyzing our broad survey of Japanese adults from 2005 to 2008, the purpose of this paper is to 
examine empirically the effects of time discounting and its behavioral biases on smoking behavior, and 
their responses to a hike in cigarette taxes. We incorporate two time discounting biases that has been 
reported in dynamic choice theory: (i) hyperbolic discounting, under which a person discounts the 
immediate future more intensively than the distant future, and thereby makes time-inconsistent decisions; 
and (ii) the sign effect, by which a person discounts positive future payoffs more intensively than negative 
future payoffs (for the empirical validity of the biases and their implications, see, e.g., Thaler, 1981; 
Benzion et al., 1989; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Ainslie, 1992; Khwaja et al., 2007). We hypothesize 
that hyperbolic discounters smoke more than exponential discounters; that reductions in cigarette 
consumption after a tax hike amongst naïve hyperbolic smokers are larger than those amongst the others; 
and that decreases in cigarette consumption after a tax hike amongst hyperbolic smokers are larger than 
those amongst exponential smokers.  
The novelty of the present research is in the following two points. First, we identify respondents’ types 
by whether discounting is exponential or hyperbolic and by whether decision making is sophisticated or 
naïve. We estimate differences in smoking behavior among the distinct types of respondents. Second, by 
using the actual time series data of the cigarette tax, which is exogenously determined by the Japan’s 
government, we quantify how the natural experiment of cigarette tax hikes in 2006 affects smoking 
behavior of each type of respondents. To do so, we use our four-year panel survey data, in which roughly 
three to five thousands of Japanese adults each year reply to questionnaires on preferences and various 
attributes.  
The main results of this article are as follows: Firstly, discount rates and time discounting biases relate 
to cigarette consumption. Discount rates, the procrastinating tendency, and naiveness have significantly 
positive associations with cigarette consumption and the sign effect has significantly negative correlations 
to smoking behavior. Secondly, tax hikes decrease ex-post smoking. In particular, hyperbolic, 
procrastinating, or naïve respondents decrease their after-tax-hike cigarette consumption more than others, 
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implying that they postpone smoking moderation in response to future tax hikes and thereby adjust 
cigarette consumption mainly after the tax hike. Thirdly, other factors, e.g., gender, degree of risk aversion, 
education, household income, age, and existence of children significantly relate to smoking behavior. 
Finally, the government’s revenue from cigarette tax peaks at a JPY 29.92 (around USD 0.28 using the 
conversion rate [107.16] in February 2008) higher tax per cigarette than the present actual level. 
In the present research, we follow Ikeda et al. (2010) in constructing data for discount rates, hyperbolic 
discounting or procrastination, and the sign effect from response data to questions on various hypothetical 
intertemporal decisions including choices between a small amount of present money and a larger amount 
of future money. In addition, naïve and sophisticated respondents are identified by using response data to 
two questions regarding procrastination in doing homework assignments: one regarding when they used to 
plan to do homework in summer vacations in their school days; and the other regarding when they in effect 
used to do homework. Respondents are classified as naïve if they used to procrastinate doing homework 
more than they planned whereas they are classified as sophisticated otherwise.  
There are many empirical studies which investigate smoking behavior from the viewpoint of 
intertemporal decision makings (e.g., Mitchell, 1999; Bickel et al., 1999; Odum et al., 2002; Baker et al., 
2003; Sato and Ohkusa, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004; Ohmura et al., 2005; Khwaja et al., 2007; Ida and 
Goto, 2009) and by using rational addiction models (e.g., Chaloupka, 1990, 1991; Keeler et al., 1993; 
Becker et al., 1994; Bardsley and Olekalns, 1998; Luo et al., 2003; Wan, 2006). Despite many attempts, 
however, the existing literature has not incorporated the effects of time discounting biases that behavioral 
economics has been reporting as important determinants of seemingly irrational behaviors such as 
time-inconsistent impulsive consumption of drugs and cigarettes (see, e.g., Ainslie, 1992).  
Our research is closely related in spirit to Gruber and Koszegi (2001), which quantified by calibrations 
the welfare–enhancing effects of cigarette taxation under hyperbolic discounting. Although they 
emphasized the critical role that time-inconsistent preferences played in smoking-decision making, for 
their result to be empirically valid, it should be empirically examined how hyperbolic discounting affects 
smoking behavior, including responses to tax hikes, and how cigarette consumption differs between naïve 
and sophisticated smokers.1  
                                                   
1 In pararel with our research, Ida (2009) examines correlations between implusiveness (hyperbolic 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, our hypotheses of relations between 
time preferences and smoking are discussed. Section 3 presents a description of the data. Section 4 reports 
the estimation results about the determinants of smoking. Section 5 shows the differences of responses to 
tax hikes among types of time discounting and presents the policy implications of tax hikes. Finally, 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Time discounting and smoking 
 
2.1. Discount rates 
 
As shown by the theory of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988), persons with high discount rates 
can raise present utility by consuming addictive goods even if it induces future disutility by accumulating 
addiction, and thus they would smoke more than others. Indeed, significantly positive correlations between 
the amount of smoking and discount rates has been reported in literature (e.g., Bickel et al., 1999; Mitchell, 
1999; Odum et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2003; Sato and Ohkusa, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004; Ohmura et al., 
2005; Ida and Goto, 2009). Therefore, it can be hypothesized that persons with higher discount rates tend 
to smoke more than others. 
 
2.2. Hyperbolic discounting  
 
Hyperbolic discounting, under which a person discounts the immediate future more intensively than the 
distant future, induces the present bias, and thereby likely lead consumers to smoke excessively by 
underweighting the resulting future disutility. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, who are well aware of 
their procrastinating tendency due to hyperbolic discounting, smoke time-consistently by choosing 
                                                                                                                                                              
discounting) and smoking by eliciting discount rates and risk preferences simultaneously from cross-section data. 
He does not distinguish sophisticated and naïve respondents, incorporate sign effects, nor analyze the effect of 
tax hikes. 
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sequences of such high cigarette consumption levels that future selves would also choose under the same 
present bias. On the other hand, naïve hyperbolic discounters, who are unaware of their hyperbolic 
discounting, do not take into account their time-inconsistency problem in the smoking decision and 
therefore, smoke more than the sophisticated. 
From the same logic, when the cigarette tax rises, hyperbolic discounters are likely to reduce cigarette 
consumption later than exponential discounters. Insofar as hyperbolic discounters are forward-looking 
optimizers, they start decreasing cigarette consumption when the preannouncement of a future tax hike 
takes place. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, however, choose such a small decrease in earlier period 
that future selves can consistently support. It is only after the tax and hence the cigarette price actually 
rises when they decrease cigarette consumption largely. In sum, sophisticated hyperbolic discounters 
procrastinate to moderate cigarette consumption until the tax hike is actually introduced. Naïve hyperbolic 
discounters procrastinate time-inconsistently the moderation of the consumption with a high discount rate 
for immediate future disutility. Thus, we hypothesize that hyperbolic discounters tend to smoke more than 
exponential discounters, and that even when a tax hike is pre-announced, they are likely to moderate 
cigarette consumption substantially after the tax hike is actually implemented.2  
 
2.3. The sign effect 
 
The sign effect, by which a person discounts positive payoffs more intensively than negative payoffs, leads 
to moderation in current addictive consumption because future disutility through the harmful effects of 
addiction is overvalued (e.g., Baker et al., 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize that person with the sign 
                                                   
2 In the context of rational addiction, hyperbolic agents behave forward-lookingly take into account future 
utility/disutility of addictive consumption (Gruber and Koszegi, 2002). However, it is difficult to analytically 
show whether hyperbolic discounters genarally smoke more than exponential discounters. Laibson (1997, 1998) 
shows that, under certain conditions, the effective discount rate which is obtained by transforming the 
hyperbolic discounting function into the exponential one is greater than the pure exponential discount rate. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that persons with hyperbolic discounting or procrastination tend to smoke more 
than ones with exponential discounting.  
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effect smoke less than others. 
 
3. The data 
 
Our empirical research is based on the annual panel data of the Japan Household Panel Survey on 
Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction (hereafter, JHPS) from 2005 to 2008. Table1 summarizes the 
number of samples and respondents. The JHPS was set up in 2004 as a project of the COE program in 
Osaka University using a random sample by a placement method and it had 4,224 respondents in 2004 and 
2,987 in 2005. Excluding 108 individuals lost from the respondents in 2005, 2,000 new random-sampled 
individuals were added to the survey sample, and 3,763 individuals responded in 2006 and 3,112 in 2007. 
The number of respondents was 4,018 in 2008, with 2,731 being continuous respondents from the previous 
year and 1,287 mailing their poll responses. All surveys were conducted in February, except in 2006 when 
the survey was conducted in February and March.  
 
Insert Table 1: 
The number of samples and frequencies of responses 
 
3.1. Tax hikes and cigarette consumption 
 
3.1.1. Cigarette consumption 
 
The JHPS asks respondents about their smoking habits saying, “How many cigarettes do you smoke 
regularly? Select a proximal option from the following; (i) Never smoke at all; (ii) Hardly smoke; (iii) 
Smoke sometimes; (iv) About 10 cigarettes a day; (v) About a pack a day; (vi) More than 2 packs a day.” 
In 2007 and 2008, option “(vii) I used to smoke but have quit” is added. 
To quantify cigarette consumption, we categorize respondents who select option (i), (ii) or (vii) as 
nonsmokers, (iii) as smokers consuming 0 to 5 cigarettes a day, (iv) 5 to 15, (v) 15 to 40, and (vi) as more 
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than 40. By using the category data, we apply the method developed by Kimball et al. (2005) to estimate a 
log normal distribution for the distribution of the respondents’ cigarette consumption of each year, from 
which each respondent’s cigarette consumption is estimated as an expected value conditional on his or her 
categorical level of smoking. 
 
Insert Table 2:  
Summary statistics of smoking behavior 
 
Insert Figure 1:  
Transition graphs of smoking behavior 
 
The summary statistics of cigarette consumption and smoking rates are shown in Table 2 and the 
transition graphs are described in Figure 1, where SMOKING represents the cigarette consumption 
estimated above. Male smokers smoke more than a pack per day and the amounts of smoking and smoking 
rates decreased during the entire investigation. On the other hand, the reported smoking amounts for 
females are around 15 per day and the amounts increased over time from 2005 to 2007 and decreased in 
2008, although their smoking rates decrease throughout the entire period. These trends are consistent with 
the reported data of the National Survey of Health and Nutrition (NSHN) conducted by the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan: According to NSHN data from 2004 to 2005, the smoking amounts for 
male smokers decreased from 21.5 to 21.0 per day and the rates of regular smoking declined from 43.3% 
to 39.3%. As for females, smoking amounts increased from 14.6 to 15.6 per day and their rates of regular 
smoking decreased from 12.0% to 11.3%. 
 
3.1.2. Tax hikes 
 
We can examine the effect of the tax hike on smoking behavior because a change of taxation policy on 
cigarettes arose during our sample period. The Japanese Government raised the cigarette tax from JPY 
7.892 (around USD 0.074 using the conversion rate [107.16] in February 2008) to JPY 8.744 (around USD 
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0.082) per cigarette on July 1st, 2006.3 Our survey in 2006 was conducted in February, which is after the 
Cabinet meeting on January 17th adopted the outline of revisions in the taxation system, and before the 
Diet on March 27th that passed the bill.  
Our data are not frequent enough to detect the preannouncement effect of tax hikes unlike in Becker et 
al. (1994) which use monthly data. Therefore we limit our attention to smoking moderation after the tax 
hikes.4 To examine post-tax hike behavior, we define a tax variable, named TAX, which represents the tax 
levels in each year. 
 
3.2. Eliciting discount rates and its behavioral biases 
 
In the JHPS, the respondents' discount rates were measured by asking five questions about intertemporal 
choice under alternative conditions. As in the previous survey research (e.g., Harrison et al., 2002; and 
Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006), the respondents were told to choose a preferable option from two options 
“A” and “B,” e.g., “A” receiving JPY 10,000 (around USD 93.32) in two days; and “B” receiving JPY 
10,000 plus a certain amount of JPY α, say JPY 10,038 (around USD 93.67), in nine days, where choosing 
the delayed receipt “B” instead of “A” implies receiving 20% of the annual interest rate. In each question, 
eight such problems were posed in the form of a payoff table, with alternative α values, from small to large, 
and hence with alternative imputed interest rates, from low to high. 
Table 3 shows QUESTION 1, where the amount of receipt for option “A” is specified as JPY 10,000 
and the imputed interest rate for option "B" changes from -10% to 300%. Respondents are expected to 
choose option “A” at low interest rates whereas, as the imputed interest rate goes up, to switch to “B” at 
some critical high rate. The individual respondents' discount rates can be inferred by estimating the interest 
rate at which the delayed receipt of “B” is indifferent to the more immediate receipt of “A”. The elicited 
discount rates are associated with the particular choice conditions, e.g., two days vs. nine days, JPY 10,000 
                                                   
3 The price of Mild Seven Super Lights, which has hold the largest share of the Japanese market, has been risen 
from JPY 270 (around USD 2.52) per 20-cigarette pack to JPY 300 (around USD 2.80) following the tax hike. 
4 Announcement of the Cabinet approval for the still unpassed bill is weak as information about the tax hike, 
and the date when our survey was conducted, Feb., 2006, is far from the execution date, Jul. 1st, 2006. 
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for option “A” in QUESTION 1. 
     
Insert Table 3:  
Question to elicit discount rates: An example (QUESTION 1 for DR?) 
 
To test for time discounting biases, five questions were designed by controlling for: (i) money amounts 
for option “A” as JPY 10,000 or JPY 1 million (around USD 9331.84); (ii) time horizons for “A” as two 
days, one month, or ninety days; (iii) time delays as seven days or 12 months; and (iv) receipt or payment. 
In “payment” question 5, the respondents were asked to choose: “A” paying JPY 1 million in one month; 
or “B” paying JPY 1 million plus some amount in 13 months, from which acceptable interest rate 
payments to delay a JPY 1 million payment for 12 months were measured. 
From each question, we obtaine raw response data in the form of category numbers, which tell us 
between which interest rates each respondent's choice switched from option “A” to “B” if any switch takes 
place. Some subjects did not switch their choices from “A” for all offered interest rates. By using the raw 
category data, we apply the method developed by Kimball et al. (2005) to estimate a log normal 
distribution for the cross-respondent distribution of gross discount rates, from which each respondent's 
gross discount rate for a certain question, i.e., a certain payoff table, is estimated as an expected value 
conditional on his or her switch taking place at a certain observed category. Descriptive statistics of elicited 
discount rates, together with the choice conditions under which they were elicited, are summarized in Table 
4, where iDR ( 5,,1L i ) represents the discount rate estimated from question i. 
     
Insert Table 4:  
Elicited discount rates under alternative choice conditions 
 
To test for the effect of impatience on cigarette consumption, we construct DISCRATE, which 
represents the simple average of the standardized values of the elicited discount rates tiDR , ( 5,,1L i , 
2008,,2005L t ): 
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where )( ,tit DRE  and )( ,tit DRV  represent sample means and standard deviations of tiDR ,  (see table 
4). It is hypothesized that, with other things being equal, the respondents’ cigarette consumption depends 
positively on the impatience index DISCRATE. 
Table 5 shows the simple correlation of time discounting variables with SMOKING.. Consistent with 
our hypothesis mentioned above, column 1 shows a significantly positive correlation betwwwn 
DISCRATE and cigarette consumption. 5 
 
Insert Table 5: 
Correlation coefficients of time discounting variables with SMOKING 
 
Table 6 summarizes the definitions, summary statistics of variables and hypothesized signs of variables 
that are used in the analysis below.6 7 
 
Insert Table 6:  
Definitions, summary statistics, and hypothesized signs of variables 
 
3.2.1. Time discounting biases 
 
By comparing the mean values of the elicited discount rates, we examine whether our average respondent 
displays the aforementioned two biases of time discounting. First, in any years, hyperbolic discounting or 
the immediacy effect is not observed on average since the mean of discount rate DR?, imputed from the 
                                                   
5 More detailed correlation coefficients by gender in each year are summarized in Appendix B. 
6 Although the standardized average DISCRATE of the elicited discount rates should theoretically satisfy  
E (DISCRATE) = 0 and σ (DISCRATE) = 1, neither equality is actually met as seen in the table. This comes 
from the fact that the numbers of effective responses differ among the five discount rate questions. 
7 More detailed statistics by gender in each year are summarized in appendix A and C. 
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immediate future choice (i.e., 2 days or 9 days), is not significantly higher than DR?, applied to more 
distant future choice (i.e., 90 days or 97 days). Secondly, in all years, the discount rate DR? applied for 
future receipts is significantly higher than DR?, the one used to discount future payments, which implies 
that our average respondent displays the sign effect .8 
To examine the effects of the time discounting biases on the respondents' cigarette consumption, we 
construct a binary indicator HYPERBOL for hyperbolic discounting and SIGN for the sign effect, where, 
e.g., HYPERBOL=1 if DR?>DR? and HYPERBOL=0 otherwise. From the mean values of HYPERBOL 
and SIGN, shown in Table 5, the proportions of the respondents who display the anomalies are 67.3% for 
hyperbolic discounting and 90.3% for the sign effect. Our hypothesis is that, with other things being equal, 
the respondents' cigarette consumption is positively related to HYPERBOL and negatively to SIGN. 
In Table 5, the correlation coefficient of SIGN with cigarette consumption is significantly positive as 
expected above. The coefficient of HYPERBOL is, however, negative, which is inconsistent with our 
hypothesis. In section 4, we will discuss whether these results are robust after controlling other factors. 
 
3.2.2. A proxy for procrastination and naïve hyperbolic discounting 
 
To capture the immediacy effect, we also construct a proxy variable PROCR for hyperbolic discounting 
and NAÏVE for naïve agent. To measure respondents' degrees of hyperbolic discounting or procrastination, 
the JHPS survey asked them to indicate on a 5-point scale from 1 to 5 how they had been likely to 
procrastinate doing homework assignments for the vacation in their childhood.9 Variable PROCR is the 
response data to this question averaged over time, where a larger value implies a stronger tendency for 
                                                   
8 In addition, although we have not put the results of the t test in the table, DR?, the discount rate for JPY 
10,000 (around USD 93.32), is significantly higher than DR?, which applies for JPY 1 million (around USD 
9331.84). This implies that people are more patient for larger amounts than for smaller amounts. This tendency 
is called the magnitude effect (e.g., Benzion et al., 1989; Frederick et al., 2002). 
9 In Japanese elementary and high schools, students are usually assigned many pieces of homework during 
summer vacations. 
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procrastination or hyperbolic discounting. The JHPS survey also asked respondents in 2007 and 2008 how 
they had projected doing homework assignments for the vacation in their childhood with the same point 
scales as above. We define differences in PROCR from the response to this question and average them 
over time as NAÏVE, which indicates the degree of default in own planning. It is hypothesized that, with 
other things being equal, the respondents’ cigarette consumption depends positively on PROCR and 
NAÏVE. Table 5 shows that PROCR and NAÏVE have strongly positive correlation with smoking as 
predicted. 
Figure 2 shows the distributions of PROCR and NAÏVE. As shown in panel A, the proportion of people 
who had done their homework assignment latterly, whose PROCR is more than 4, is slightly less than half 
of the respondents. Meanwhile 67.1% of all respondents, shown in panel B, had been unable to do their 
homework assignment when planned. 
 
Insert Figure 2: 
Distributions of PROCR and NAÏVE 
 
3.3. Control variables 
 
We define the following variables for controlling personal attributes: RISKAV, MALE, UNIV, INCOME, 
AGE, and CHILD. 
RISKAV measures the degree of risk aversion, which is constructed by subtracting from 100 the 
respondents’ responses to the question: “When you go out, how high a probability of rainfall makes you 
bring an umbrella with you?” We hypothesize that more risk-averse respondents are likely to consume less 
cigarettes. 
MALE is a binary indicator which equals 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if female. As shown in 
Table 2 and Figure1, average cigarette consumption and smoking rates for males are larger than for 
females in our Japanese data, and therefore we naturally hypothesize that being male has positive effects 
on smoking. 
UNIV is a proxy variable of respondents’ education level, which equals 1 if the respondent had 
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received college education and 0 otherwise. It was hypothesized that persons with a college background 
smoke less than others. 
INCOME takes the value of per capita household income in ten thousand yen. Previous studies 
empirically verify positive relation between income levels and the smoking status (e.g., Hersch, 2000; Ishii, 
2005).10 According to the literature, we hypothesize that persons earning higher incomes are likely to 
consume less cigarettes. 
AGE takes ages of respondents. Hersch (2000) shows that the effect of age on cigarette consumption 
displays a nonlinear relation, which is significantly positive for the linear term and negative for the 
quadratic term. Ishii (2005) reports the same relation for japanese female samples. We hypothesize that the 
effect of AGE on cigarette consumption is positive in the linear term and negative in the quadratic term. 
CHILD is a binary indicator that takes 1 if the respondent has children and 0 otherwise. Hersch (2000) 
reports that females having a youngest child under 2 years old decrease their cigarette consumption. Our 
hypothesis is that females with children moderate their smoking behavior. 
The correlation coefficients between control variables and SMOKING are shown in table 7.11  
 
Insert Table 7: 
Correlations between SMOKING and control variables 
 
MALE displays a significantly positive coefficient and RISKAV and UNIV display negative 
coefficients for all, male, and female samples as expected. The coefficient of INCOME for female samples 
is significantly negative as hypothesized. On the other hand, for all and male samples, the coefficients of 
INCOME are insignificant, which is consistent with Ishii (2005). 
Coefficients of AGE are negative and strongly significant. These results are seemingly shown as 
                                                   
10 Hersch (2000) reports that high-income groups display lower smoking rates than other groups by using US 
data. Ishii (2005) shows that, by using Japanese data, logarithmic household income displays a significantly 
negative correlation with the amount of cigarette consumption for female samples and with smoking rates for 
male and female samples. 
11 More detailed statistics by gender-year are summarized in Appendix D. 
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contrary evidence for the literature and our hypothesis. As seen in Figure 3, however, which displays graph 
trends of averaged cigarette consumption of smokers by gender in their 20s to 70s, cigarette consumption 
looks like following quadratic trends. In the next section, we will use the linear and the quadratic terms of 
AGE as explanatory variables for capturing the age trend of smoking. 
 
Insert Figure 3: 
Age trends of averaged cigarette consumption of smokers 
 
As is pointed out in Hersch (2000), for female samples, CHILD displays a significantly negative 
coefficient, which implies that the presence of children reduces cigarette consumption.12  
 
4. Determinants of smoking behavior 
 
In this section, we estimate the marginal effects on SMOKING using random-effects tobit models to 
identify determinants of cigarette consumption. The following three models are estimated: model (1) uses 
as explanatory variables DISCRATE, HYPERBOL, SIGN, and other control variables including TAX; 
model (2) adopts PROCR, instead of HYPERBOL, to capture the effect of hyperbolic discounting; and 
model (3) adopts NAÏVE for hyperbolic discounting. All the models are estimated in all, male and female 
samples. Table 8 shows the estimation results. All coefficients display the marginal effects which are 
measured around the mean values of smokers. 
 
Insert Table8: 
Random-effects tobit estimations for SMOKING 
 
                                                   
12 Unreported tests of the differences of the average of cigarette consumption between females with and without 
children including nonsmokers’ samples suggest that the former significantly smoke less than the latter, but 
using only smokers’ samples suggest that having children is insignificant. This implies that having children 
leads to quitting, rather than reducing, smoking.  
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4.1. Tax hikes 
 
The coefficients of TAX are significantly negative for all and male samples, where hiking per cigarette tax 
by one yen, ceteris paribus, decreases per capita cigarette consumption by 0.32 (model (3)) to 0.43 (model 
(2)) in all samples or by 0.49 (model (3)) to 0.60 (model (2)) in male samples. On the other hand, the 
insignificant coefficients for the female sample suggest that there would be some female-specific factors 
that push up their smoking in our sample period. Differences in smoking moderation behavior under tax 
hikes due to  the types of time discounting and/or the degree of the biases will be estimated in the next 
section.  
 
4.2. Time discounting 
 
In model (1), consistent with our hypothesis, DISCRATE displays positive effects on cigarette 
consumption, which are, significant for all and female samples. The sign effect SIGN has expected 
negative coefficients, which are significant for all and male samples. In contrast, the results regarding the 
coefficients of HYPERBOL are weak. In particular,  they are insignificantly negative for all and male 
samples. 
In model (2) and model (3), all of DISCRATE, PROCR and NAÏVE display fairly significant 
coefficients with the expected sign. Especially, all of them have strongly significant coefficients in the all 
sample case. Male samples also display significant effects of these variables, and for female samples all 
coefficients of time discounting variables except for the sign effect of model (2) are significant. All of them 
are consistent with our expectations.  
In sum, cigarette consumption has expected correlations with discount rates, procrastination, naiveness, 
and the sign effect. Discount rates, for example, that exceed the average by one unit of standard deviation, 
ceteris paribus, increase the amount of cigarette consumption by 0.32 (model (2)) to 0.34 (model (3)) for 
males and by 0.20 (model (3)) to 0.32 (model (1)) for females. The respondents who had procrastinated 
about doing their homework until the very end of the vacation (PROCR=5), ceteris paribus, smoke more 
than respondents who had finished it at the beginning of the vacation (PROCR=1) by 1.096 for males and 
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by 0.528 for females. The most naïve respondents (NAÏVE=4) smoke more than sophisticated ones 
(NAÏVE=0) by 0.874 for males and by 0.539 for females. The respondents with the sign effect (SIGN=1) 
consume less cigarettes than others, around 0.5 for males and 0.3-0.4 for females.  
 
4.3. Control variables 
 
Estimated coefficients of risk aversion variables (RISKAV) display expectedly negative signs , which are 
strongly significant for all and female samples in all the  models. For example, cigarette consumption for 
female respondents who are risk averse such that their critical precipitation percentage to bring an umbrella 
is 10% higher than the average is ceteris paribus lower than the average female by 0.13 (model (3)) to 0.14 
(model (1) and (2)). The coefficients of MALE display significantly positive implying that male 
respondents smoke more heavily than female ones by 5.21 (model (3)) to 5.71 (model (1)). Coefficients of 
UNIV are strongly significant consistent with our expectations for all, male, and female in the entire 
models. Respondents with a college background smoke less than others by 0.91 (model (3)) to 1.41 (model 
(2)) for males and by 1.43 (model (3)) to 1.48 (model (1)) for females. Smoking depend significantly on 
AGE in a quadratic form in the entire models, such that cigarette consumption increase with aging at 
decreasing rates until some critical age, and thereafter it decreases at increasing rates. The critical peaks of 
smoking are an age of 39.89 (i.e., 0.164/2*0.002) years (model (1)), 41.97 (model (2)) and 39.96(model 
(3)) for male smokers and 38.32 (model (1)), 38.37 (model (2)) and 40.29 (model (3)) for female smokers 
(after controlling other personal attributes). The estimated signs are consistent with our hypothesis, and the 
peak ages for cigarette consumption are more or less the same by gender with other things being equal. 
The coefficients of per capita household income (INCOME) are significantly negative and those of the 
income squared (INCOME^2) are significantly positive only for female samples in the entire models. The 
critical income levels of females at the bottom of cigarette consumption are 7.04 (model (1)), 7.04 (model 
(2)), and 7.03 million yen (model (3)). The coefficients of CHILD are, as are expected, significantly 
negative for females suggesting that female respondents with children smoke less than others by 0.91 
(model (3)) to 0.94 (model (1)). 
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5. The effects of tax hikes 
 
In this section, we analyze the effects of time discounting biases on the reduction of cigarette consumption 
responding to the hiking of cigarette tax. To do so, we sort the sample from the viewpoints of hyperbolic 
discounting, the procrastinating tendency, and naïveness, and thereby compare the estimated coefficients of 
TAX among the sorted samples. Our hypothesis is that cigarette consumption of hyperbolic discounting, 
procrastination, or naïve agents respond more negatively to tax hikes than other samples. 
 
5.1. Responses to tax hikes with/without hyperbolic discounting 
 
To detect the effect of hyperbolic discounting, respondents are classified by using HYPERBOL and PROC 
as follows:  
 
(i) Hyperbolic or exponential: Agents are classified as 
 hyperbolic if HYPERBOL= 1; and 
 exponential if HYPERBOL= 0   
(ii) The degree of procrastinating tendency is classified as  
 severe procrastination if PROCR?5; 
 modest procrastination if 5 > PROCR?3; and  
 weak/ no procrastination if  PROCR< 3. 
 
Table 9 shows the marginal effects of tax hikes on cigarette consumption for each type of agents by 
using random-effects tobit models. All models use SMOKING for dependent variables, and are estimated 
in all, male and female samples by controlling for DISCRATE, SIGN, RISKAV, MALE, UNIV, AGE, 
AGE^2, INCOME, INCOME^2, and CHILD. The coefficients indicate the marginal effects of TAX.  
Panel A of table 9 displays the estimated coefficients of TAX whose samples are sorted by using 
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HYPERBOL. For all and male samples, the coefficients of hyperbolic agents (HYPERBOL=1) are 
significantly negative and the coefficients of exponential agents (HYPERBOL=0) are insignificant. The 
differences of the responses to tax hikes between hyperbolic and exponential agents are -0.186 in all 
samples and -0.442 in the male samples, which are both negative as expected. These results imply that 
hyperbolic agents reduced cigarette consumption after the tax hike more than exponential discounting 
agents. For the female samples, the estimated coefficients are insignificant in both agents, however. 
Panel B compares the effect of tax reduction on cigarette consumption among different degrees of 
procrastinating tendency. In the all sample case, the coefficients are significantly negative for respondents 
with strong and modest procrastination while the coefficient is insignificantly negative for respondents 
with weak/ no procrastination. The difference of the coefficients between the respondents with strong 
procrastination and those with weak/ no procrastination is positive as expected. For males, the coefficients 
for respondents with strong procrastination and with weak/no procrastination are significantly negative, 
where the difference between the coefficients is negative, consistent with our expectations. For the female 
sample, although all the coefficients are insignificant, they have expected signs. In sum, hyperbolic or 
procrastinative agents reduce their cigarette consumption more than exponential agents after tax hikes, 
which implies that these agents postpone smoking moderation up to after-tax-hike period even though the 
tax hike was preannounced several months before.. 
 
Insert Table 9: 
Comparing the marginal effects of tax hikes for each agent?HYPERBOL and PROCR? 
 
5.2. Naïve vs. Sophisticated 
 
We also detect the effect of naiveness by defining the degree of naiveness as follows: 
 
(iii) The degree of naiveness: Respondents are classified as: 
 sophisticated if NAÏVE < 1; 
 naïve if 1?NAÏVE < 4; and  
 18 
 strongly naïve if NAÏVE = 4.  
 
By sorting the sample by the degree of naiveness, Table 10 compares the marginal effects of tax hikes 
on the cigarette consumption, which are estimated in the same manner as table 9. The values of the 
estimated coefficients and their differences are consistent with our expectations. In particular, the 
coefficients for strongly naïve agents in all and female samples and those for naïve agents in all and male 
samples are significant, where all of the differences exhibit negative signs as expected. These results imply 
that naïve agents postpone smoking moderation even when a tax hike is pre-announced. It is only after the 
actual tax hike when they reduce cigarette consumption. 
 
Insert Table 10: 
Comparing the marginal effects of tax hikes for each agent?NAÏVE? 
 
5.3. Policy implications 
 
Cigarettes are addictive goods which have two important aspects related to policyl decisions: firstly, 
habitual consumption of them damages health status, and consequently brings about decreases of social 
welfare and  increases of the medical care costs; and secondly the revenues from cigarette taxes  are a 
significant source of public finance. For the governments to decide the cigarette tax level by taking into 
account both national health care and tax revenues, it is important to estimate the quantitative effects of 
cigarette tax hikes on smoking behavior and on the resulting tax revenues.  
Table 11 shows the estimates of cigarette consumption, the smoking rate, the smoking cessation rate, 
and the tax revenue after tax hikes, where the three alternative tax hikes are considered: hikes by JPY 10, 
20, and 35 (around USD 0.09, 0.19, and 0.33) per cigarette. All results are obtained from the tax elasticity 
of cigarette demand for smokers, ranging from 0.079 for the heaviest smokers to 1.329 for the lightest 
smokers.13  
                                                   
13 The elasticity are calculated from the marginal effects of TAX, -0.416, in model (1) for the all sample, which 
is measured around the mean values of smokers in 2008. Appendices E and F show the cases of models (2) and 
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In 2008, when most cigarettes are priced at JPY 300 (around USD 2.80) per pack, the average cigarette 
consumption for smokers is 20.87, and the smoking rate is 25.1%. In the case of a tax hike by JPY 10 
(around USD 0.09) per cigarette, which is equivalent to setting the price at JPY 500 (i.e., 300+ (10*20)) 
per pack (around USD 4.67 per pack), the predicted average cigarette consumption after the tax hike is 
18.9 and the smoking rate becomes 22.4%. Consequently, 10.7% of smokers reduce their cigarette 
consumption in response to the tax hike, and the resulting increase in the rate of tax revenue is 73.2%. In 
the case of a tax hike by JPY 20 (around USD 0.19) per cigarette, which corresponds to pricing at JPY 700 
(around USD 6.53) per pack, the smoking rate becomes 22.4%, and the resulting increase in the rate of tax 
revenue is 107.2%. In the case of hiking tax by JPY 35 (around USD 0.33) per cigarette, which is 
equivalent to pricing at JPY 1000 (around USD 9.33) per pack, the smoking rate becomes 15.6%, and the 
resulting increase in the rate of tax revenue is 107.9%. 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the amount of the per-cigarette tax hike and the associated 
increasing rate of the tax revenue. The government revenue reaches a peak when the per-cigarette tax hike 
equals JPY 29.92 (around USD 0.28), with the corresponding per-pack cigarette price is JPY 898.4 (around 
USD 8.38). The break-even tax-hike which keeps the tax revenues unchanged is estimated as JPY 58.85 
(around USD 0.55). This implies that even though the government sets the per-pack price of cigarettes at 
JPY 1,477.09 (around USD 13.78), there is a room to raise tax revenues on one hand, and to decrease the 
domestic smoking rate, on the other hand.14 
 
Insert Table 11: 
Tax hikes, smoking moderation, and tax revenue 
                                                                                                                                                              
model (3). 
14 On March 24th, the Japanese government has passed a bill on hiking the cigarette tax by JPY 3.5 (around 
USD 0.03) per cigarette in October 1st, 2010. Following the passage, JT (Japan Tobacco, Inc.), the Japan’s 
monopolistic cigarette manufacturer, has announced the decision to increase cigarette prices to around JPY 410 
to 440 (around USD 3.83 to 4.11) per 20-cigarette pack. According to our estimation results, it is predicted that, 
by executing the tax- and price-increasing policy, smokers would decrease by 10.7%, and that government’s 
revenue would increase by about 20.3 to 28.4%.  
 20 
 
Insert Figure 4: 
Tax hikes and the increasing rates of tax revenue 
 
6. Conclusion 
By using our broad panel survey of Japanese adults, we have found that discount rates and its behavioral 
biases affect smoking behavior. Respondents’ discount rates are higher, or their procrastinating tendency or 
naiveness is stronger, they are likely to smoke more than others. In the response to cigarette tax hikes, 
hyperbolic, procrastinating or naïve agents postpone smoking moderation up to after-tax-hike period even 
though the tax hike was preannounced several months before.  
We have also clarified that the Japanese government is able to hike cigarette taxes for increasing tax 
revenue. The government’s tax-rising policy, however, does not necessary lead to consumer’s welfare 
improvement. It causes welfare losses to exponential discounters, whereas it works as a commitment 
devise for hyperbolic discounters and consequently increases their welfare level. As the further research, 
we would like to incorporate heterogeneity of discounting function to determine precise welfare-changing 
processes and the quantities induced by tax-changing policies.
 21 
References 
 
 
 
Ainslie, G., 1992, Picoeconomics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Ainslie, G., 2001, Breakdown of Will, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Baker, F., M. W. Johnson, and W.K.Bickel, 2003, Delay discounting in current and never-before cigarette 
smokers: Similarities and differences across commodity, Sign, and Magnitude, Journal of  Abnormal 
Psychology 112, 382-92. 
Bardsley, P., and N. Olekalns, 1999, Cigarette and tobacco consumption: Have anti-smoking policies made 
a difference?, Economic Record 75, 225-240. 
Becker, G. S., M. Grossman, and K. M. Murphy, 1994, An empirical analysis of cigarette addiction, 
American Economic Review 84, 396-418. 
Becker, G. S., and K. M. Murphy, 1988, A theory of rational addiction, Journal of Political Economics 96, 
675-700. 
Benzion, U., A. Rapoport, and J. Yagil, 1989, Discount rates inferred from decisions: An experimental 
study, Management Science 35, 270-284. 
Bickel, W. K., A.L. Odum, and G. J. Madden, 1999, Impulsivity and Cigarette Smoking: Delay 
Discounting in Current Never, and Ex-smokers, Psychopharmacology 146, 447-454. 
Borghans, L., and B. Golsteyn, 2006, Time discounting and the body mass index: Evidence from the 
Netherlands, Economics and Human Biology 4, 39-61. 
Chaloupka, F., 1990, Men, women, and addiction: The case of cigarette smoking, NBER Working Paper 
3267. 
Chaloupka, F., 1991, Rational addictive behavior and cigarette smoking, Journal of Political Ecocnomy 99, 
675-700. 
Gruber, J. and B. Koszegi, 2001, Is addiction “rational”?: Theory and evidence, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116, 1261-1303. 
Harrison, G. W., M.I. Lau, and M.B. Williams, 2002, Estimating individual discount rates in Denmark: A 
field experiment, American Economic Review 92, 1606-1617. 
 22 
Hersch, J, 2000, Gender, Income Levels, and the Demand for Cigarettes, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
21:2, 3, 263-282. 
Ida, T., 2009, Anomaly, Impulsivity, and Addiction, Journal of Socio-Economics, forthcoming. 
Ida, T. and R. Goto, 2009, Simultaneous measurement of time and risk preferences: Stated preference 
discrete choice modeling analysis depending on smoking behavior, International Economic Review 50, 
forthcoming. 
Ikeda, S., M. Kang, and F. Ohtake, 2010, Hyperbolic discounting, the sign effect, and the body mass index, 
Journal of Health Economics, 29, 268-284. 
Ishii, K., 2005, Tabacco zei no hikiage ya Kenko zousinhou wa kinnen ni dokomade yukou ka (in 
Japanese), Keio University Market Quality Research Project (21COE), DP2005-019. 
Keeler, T. E., T-W. Hu, P. G. Barnett, and W. G. Manning, 1993, Taxation, regulation, and addiction: A 
demand function for cigarettes based on time-series evidence, Journal of Health Economics, 12, 1-18. 
Khwaja, A., D. Silverman, and F. Sloan, 2007, Time preference, time discounting, and smoking decisions, 
Journal of Health Economics 26, 927-979. 
Kimball, M. S., C. R. Sahm, and M. D. Shapiro, Using survey-based risk tolerance, 2005, ISER Seminar, 
unpublished. 
Laibson, D., 1997, Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 443-477. 
Laibson, D., 1998, Life-cycle consumption and hyperbolic discount functions, European Economic 
Review 42, 861-871. 
Luo, F., M. Abdel-Ghany, and I. Ogawa, 2003, Cigarette smoking in Japan: Examination of myopic and 
rational models of addictive behavior, Journal of Family and Economic Issues 24, 308-317. 
Mitchell, S. H., 1999, Measures of impulsivity in cigarette smokers and non-smokers, 
Psychopharmacology, 146, 455-464. 
Odum, A. L., G. J. Madden, and W. K. Bickel, 2002, Discounting of delayed health gains and losses by 
current, never- and ex-smokers of cigarettes, Nicotine and Tobacco Research 4, 295-303. 
Ohmura, Y., T. Takahashi, and N. Kitamura, 2005, Discounting delayed and probabilistic monetary gains 
and losses by smokers of cigarettes, Psychopharmacology 182, 508-515. 
Prelec, D. and G. Loewenstein, 1991, Decision making over time and under uncertainty: a common 
approach, Management Science 37, 770-786. 
 23 
Reynolds, B., K. Karraker, K. Horn, and J. B. Richards, 2004, Delay and probability discounting as related 
to different stages of adolescent smoking and non-smoking, Behavioural Processes 64, 333-344. 
Sato, M., and Y. Ohkusa, 2003, The relationship between smoking initiation and time discounting factor, 
risk aversion and information, Applied Economics Letters 10, 287-289.  
Thaler, R., 1981, Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency, Economics Letters 8, 201-207. 
Wan, J., 2006, Cigarette tax revenues and tobacco control in Japan, Applied Economics 33, 1663-1675. 
 
 24 
 
 
Note: The data are from the Japan Household Panel Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction 
from 2005 to 2008. The row of “Num. of samples” shows the number of respondents each year. The row of 
“Freq. of respondents” shows the number of frequencies in responses during our sample period.   
 
Table1: The number of samples and frequencies of responses
2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Num. of samples 2,987 3,763 3,112 4,018 13,880
Four times Three times Twice Once Total
Freq. of responses 1,824 1,125 488 2,233 5,670
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Note: The data are from the Japan Household Panel Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction 
from 2005 to 2008. Summary statistics of Panel A include nonsmokers in samples. Panel B shows the 
statistics only smokers. Panel C shows rates of regular smokers.
Table2: Summary statistics of smoking behavior
(Panel A) Cigarette consumption
 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mean 6.502 6.226 5.873 5.238
S.D. 11.971 11.679 11.294 10.724
Freq. 2,972 3,746 3,084 4,001
Mean 11.373 10.937 10.218 9.172
S.D. 14.728 14.378 13.703 13.394
Freq. 1,395 1,763 1,437 1,870
Mean 2.193 2.038 2.081 1.785
S.D. 6.223 6.054 6.649 5.748
Freq. 1,577 1,983 1,647 2,131
(Panel B) Cigarette consumption (Smokers)
 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mean 21.517 21.879 21.820 20.873
S.D. 12.296 11.697 11.222 11.488
Freq. 898 1,066 830 1,004
Mean 24.483 24.253 23.760 23.368
S.D. 12.077 11.635 10.712 11.193
Freq. 648 795 618 734
Mean 13.832 14.916 16.166 14.092
S.D. 9.136 8.734 10.777 9.355
Freq. 250 271 212 270
(Panel C) Smoking rates
 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mean 0.264 0.258 0.245 0.224
S.D. 0.441 0.437 0.430 0.417
Freq. 2,972 3,746 3,084 4,001
Mean 0.424 0.419 0.404 0.367
S.D. 0.494 0.494 0.491 0.482
Freq. 1,395 1,763 1,437 1,870
Mean 0.122 0.114 0.106 0.099
S.D. 0.327 0.318 0.308 0.299
Freq. 1,577 1,983 1,647 2,131
All
Male
Female
Male
Female
All
Male
Female
All
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Table 3: Question to elicit discount rates: An example (QUESTION 1 for DR1)  
 
Suppose you have two options to receive some money. You may choose Option “A”, to receive 
10,000 JPY in two days; or Option “B”, to receive a different amount in nine days. Compare the 
amounts and timing in Option “A” with Option “B” and indicate which amount you would prefer to 
receive for each of all 8 choices.  
 
Note: This is a question in the Japan Household Panel Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction 
from 2005 to 2008. The US dollar amounts are computed by using the average JPY/ USD exchange rate, 
107.16, in February, 2008. 
Option A  
(Receipt in 2 days) 
Option B 
(Receipt in 9 days) 
Interest rate 
(Annual) 
Circle A or B. 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 9,981 (USD 93.14) -10% A B 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) 0% A B 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 10,019 (USD 93.50) 10% A B 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 10,038 (USD 93.67) 20% A B 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 10,096 (USD 94.21) 50% A B 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 10,191 (USD 95.10) 100% A B 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 10,383 (USD 96.89) 200% A B 
JPY 10,000 (USD 93.32) JPY 10,574 (USD 98.67) 300% A B 
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Table 5: Correlation coefficients of time discounting variables with SMOKING
DISCRATE 0.116 *** 0.075 *** 0.045 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
HYPERBOL -0.048 *** -0.039 *** -0.015
(0.000) (0.003) (0.219)
SIGN -0.024 ** -0.035 ** -0.024 *
(0.014) (0.015) (0.078)
PROCR 0.124 *** 0.084 *** 0.059 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NAÏVE 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.057 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P-values are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
SMOKING
Note: This table shows the correlation coefficients of cigarette consumption
with time discounting variables. Samples include nonsmokers.
FemaleMaleAll
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Table 6: Definition, summary statistics, and hypothesized signs of variables
Definition Mean S.D. Obs. Hypothesis
Cigarette
consumption SMOKING The amount of cigarette consumptioon per day. 5.920 11.398 13,803
Taxation
level TAX
Taxation level per cigarette. 7.892 yen from 2005 to 2006 and 8.744 yen
from 2007 to 2008. 8.330 0.426 13,880 ?
DISCRATE
Simple mean, defined by equation (1), of the standardized values of the
elicited discount rates DRi (i = 1, … ,5) as a measure of the degree of
impatience.
0.042 0.718 10,125 ?
HYPERBOL
A binary indicator for hyperbolic discounting which equals 1 if DR1 > DR2,
and 0 otherwise. 0.673 0.469 12,639 ?
PROCR
Time averaged response to the question ‘When did you do homework for the
vacation in your childhood? ’ on a 5-poit scale, from 1 (Homework was
finished at ‘the beginning of the vacation’ ) to 5 (it was not done until ‘ the
very end of the vacation ’ ), which is a proxy measure of the degree of
procrastination.
3.262 1.184 13,827 ?
NAÏVE
Time averaged difference between respondents' plan and execution to do
homework in summer vacation in their high school day. 1.117 1.206 11,638 ?
SIGN
A binary indicator for the sign effect which equals 1 if DR4 > DR5, and 0
otherwise. 0.903 0.296 10,450 ?
RISKAV
A variable which measures the degree of risk aversion, constructed by
subtracting from 100 the respondents' responses to the question: "When you
go out, how high probability of rainfall makes you bring an umbrella with
you?"
50.160 20.203 13,654 ?
MALE
A binary indicator for males which equals 1 for male respondents and 0
otherwise. 0.469 0.499 13,880 ?
UNIV
A binary indicator for university graduates which equals 1 for university
graduates and 0 otherwise. 0.218 0.413 13,454 ?
INCOME Per capita household income in ten thousand yen. 223.615 174.910 11,608 ?
AGE Ages of respondents. 49.686 13.058 13,880 ?
CHILD
A binary indicator for parent of children which equals 1 for respondents with
childlen and 0 otherwise. 0.811 0.391 13,639 ?
Control
variables
Variables
Time
Preferences
factors
Note: "Hypothesis" shows the theoritically predicted signs of associations with smoking.
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Table 7: Correlations between control variables and SMOKING
MALE 0.366 *** NA NA
(0.000)
UNIV -0.017 ** -0.130 *** -0.067 ***
(0.050) (0.000) (0.000)
RISKAV -0.099 *** -0.111 *** -0.062 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INCOME 0.003 0.001 -0.042 ***
(0.719) (0.927) (0.001)
AGE -0.034 *** -0.056 *** -0.107 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CHILD -0.032 *** 0.003 -0.039 ***
(0.000) (0.820) (0.001)
P-values are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Notes: This table shows the correlation coefficients of cigarette consumption with
control variables. Samples include nonsmokers.
SMOKING
All Male Female
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Table 9: Comparing the marginal effects of tax hikes for each agent ?HYPERBOL and PROCR?
(Panel A) HYPERBOL
All -0.412 ** -0.226
(0.023) (0.415) 
Difference -0.186
Male -0.642 *** -0.199
(0.007) (0.497) 
Difference 0.442
Female -0.154 -0.181
(0.452) (0.634) 
Difference 0.027
 
(Panel B) PROCR
All -0.975 ** -0.393 ** -0.451
(0.047) (0.043) (0.174) 
Difference -0.524
Male -1.120 * -0.336 -0.968 ***
(0.061) (0.139) (0.002) 
Difference -0.153
Female -0.643 -0.487 0.159
(0.403) (0.402) (0.525) 
Difference -0.802
P-values are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Exponential
(HYPERBOL=0)
Strong
procrastination
Procrastination
Weak/ No
procrastination
Hyperbolic
(HYPERBOL=1)
"Difference" shows the differences between marginal effects of Hyperbolic and Exponential in
Panel A, and the differences between marginal effeccts of Strong procrastination and Weak/ No
Procrastination in Panel B.
(PROCR=5)
Notes: This tables show the coefficients of marginal effects of TAX by estimating random-
effects tobit models. Samples are sorted by using NAIVE. SMOKING is used as an explained
variable and DRSTD, SIGN, RISKAV, MALE, UNIV, AGE, AGE^2, INCOME,
INCOME^2, and CHILD are used  as explanatory variables.
(5>PROCR?3) (PROCR<3)
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Table 10: Comparing the marginal effects of tax hikes for each agent ?NAÏVE?
All -2.106 ** -0.344 *** -0.140
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.551) 
Difference -1.966
Male -1.512 -1.296 ** -0.407
 (0.180) (0.030) (0.202) 
Difference -1.105
Female -3.907 *** -2.678 0.193
 (0.001) (0.623) (0.507) 
Difference -4.100
P-values are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
"Difference" shows the differences between marginal effects of Strong naive and Sophisticate.  
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of marginal effects of TAX by estimating random-
effects tobit models. Samples are sorted by using NAIVE. SMOKING is used as an explained
variable and DRSTD, SIGN, RISKAV, MALE, UNIV, AGE, AGE^2, INCOME,
INCOME^2, and CHILD are used  as explanatory variables.
(4>NAÏVE?1) (NAÏVE<1)(NAÏVE=4)
Naïve SophisticateStrong naïve
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Table 11: Tax hikes, smoking moderation, and increasing rates of tax revenue
Model (1): The marginal effect of TAX= -0.416  
before tax hikes
Cigarette price per pack
JPY 300
(USD 2.80)
JPY 500
(USD 4.67)
JPY 700
(USD 6.53)
JPY 1000
(USD 9.33)
?TAX per cigarette JPY 0
(USD 0)
JPY 10
(USD 0.09)
JPY 20
(USD 0.19)
JPY 35
(USD 0.33)
Averaged cigarette consumption 20.873 18.880 14.725 13.956
Smoking rates 25.1% 22.4% 22.4% 15.6%
Smoking cessation rates for smokers 0.0% 10.7% 10.7% 37.8%
Increasing rates of revenues 0.0% 73.2% 107.2% 107.9%
after tax hikes
Notes: This tabel shows the predicted smoking status and increasing rates of government's revenues responding to tax
hikes by JPY 10, 20, and 35 (around USD 0.09, 0.19, and 0.33) per cigarette. The estimated coefficient of TAX in
model (1) for full samples is used for the predictions. The marginal effect is measured around mean values of smokers
in 2008. The row of "Cigarette price per pack" shows the hypothetical prices per 20-cigarette pack after tax hikes
calculated by (20*?TAX per cigarette). The row of "?TAX per cigarette" shows the increased rates of tax per
cigarette. The rows of "Averaged cigarette consumption", "Smoking rates", and "Smoking cessation rates for smokers"
show the resulting status of cigarette consumption after tax hikes. The row of "Increasing rates of revenues" shows the
net increasing rates of government's revenues by hiking cigarette tax.
 35 
Figure 1: Transition graphs of smoking behavior
Note: The graphs show trends of smoking behavior. Panel A shows averaged cigarette
consumption including nonsmokers in samples. Panel B shows ageraged cigarette
consumption among smokers. Panel C shows rates of regular smokers.
(Panel C) Smoking rates
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Figure 2: Distributions of PROCR and NAÏVE 
(Panel A) PROCR
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     Figure 3: Age trends of averaged cigarette consumption of smokers
Notes: the graphs show the age trends of averaged cigarette consumption including
nonsmokers. The horizonal axes indicate the averaged number of cigarette consumption.
The vertical axes indicate age brackets.
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Figure 4: Tax hikes and the increasing rates of tax revenue
Notes: This figure shows the predicted increasing rates of government's revenues
responding to tax hikes. The horizonal axis indicates increased rates of tax per
cigarette. The vertical axis indicates net increasing rates of government's revenues
by hiking cigarette tax in JPY terms. The estimated coefficient of TAX in model (1)
for full samples is used for the predictions. The marginal effect is measured around
mean values of smokers in 2008.
The marginal effect of TAX= -0.416 (model (1))
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
?TAX
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 ra
te
s o
f t
ax
 re
ve
nu
e
(Unit: JPY)
 39 
Appendix A: Summary statistics of time preferences
All samples Male samples Female samples
2005 2005 2005
Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax
DR1 2737 1.904 2.390 -0.369 5.724 DR1 1296 2.088 2.442 -0.369 5.724 DR1 1441 1.739 2.332 -0.369 5.724
DR2 2768 1.892 2.421 -0.373 5.742 DR2 1307 2.075 2.484 -0.373 5.742 DR2 1461 1.728 2.351 -0.373 5.742
DR3 2790 0.153 0.193 -0.121 0.512 DR3 1320 0.172 0.198 -0.121 0.512 DR3 1470 0.136 0.186 -0.121 0.512
DR4 2771 0.023 0.042 -0.065 0.118 DR4 1312 0.028 0.043 -0.065 0.118 DR4 1459 0.018 0.040 -0.065 0.118
DR5 2331 -0.008 0.044 -0.073 0.117 DR5 1116 -0.006 0.045 -0.073 0.117 DR5 1215 -0.010 0.043 -0.073 0.117
DISCRATE 2202 0.042 0.688 -1.376 2.033 DISCRATE 1051 0.132 0.707 -1.376 2.033 DISCRATE 1151 -0.040 0.660 -1.376 2.033
HYPERBOL 2694 0.621 0.485 0 1 HYPERBOL 1271 0.595 0.491 0 1 HYPERBOL 1423 0.644 0.479 0 1
SIGN 2289 0.885 0.319 0 1 SIGN 1096 0.885 0.319 0 1 SIGN 1193 0.884 0.320 0 1
PROCR 2963 3.263 1.195 1 5 PROCR 1395 3.485 1.155 1 5 PROCR 1568 3.066 1.196 1 5
NAIVE 1951 1.087 1.196 -2 4 NAIVE 860 1.129 1.217 -2 4 NAIVE 1091 1.055 1.179 -2 4
2006 2006 2006
Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax
DR1 3444 1.798 2.274 -0.363 5.537 DR1 1631 2.060 2.361 -0.363 5.537 DR1 1813 1.563 2.168 -0.363 5.537
DR2 3464 1.843 2.387 -0.372 5.675 DR2 1639 2.111 2.489 -0.372 5.675 DR2 1825 1.602 2.265 -0.372 5.675
DR3 3475 0.147 0.183 -0.117 0.503 DR3 1655 0.170 0.191 -0.117 0.503 DR3 1820 0.125 0.173 -0.117 0.503
DR4 3475 0.024 0.042 -0.065 0.118 DR4 1656 0.031 0.044 -0.065 0.118 DR4 1819 0.017 0.039 -0.065 0.118
DR5 2912 -0.008 0.040 -0.070 0.115 DR5 1386 -0.005 0.042 -0.070 0.115 DR5 1526 -0.010 0.038 -0.070 0.115
DISCRATE 2784 0.033 0.693 -1.396 2.099 DISCRATE 1322 0.158 0.730 -1.396 2.099 DISCRATE 1462 -0.079 0.637 -1.396 2.099
HYPERBOL 3412 0.585 0.493 0 1 HYPERBOL 1611 0.540 0.499 0 1 HYPERBOL 1801 0.625 0.484 0 1
SIGN 2862 0.902 0.297 0 1 SIGN 1363 0.902 0.298 0 1 SIGN 1499 0.903 0.297 0 1
PROCR 3747 3.277 1.171 1 5 PROCR 1767 3.487 1.135 1 5 PROCR 1980 3.090 1.171 1 5
NAIVE 2962 1.120 1.201 -2 4 NAIVE 1348 1.165 1.204 -2 4 NAIVE 1614 1.083 1.198 -2 4
2007 2007 2007
Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax
DR1 2905 1.591 1.968 -0.339 5.074 DR1 1350 1.851 2.059 -0.339 5.074 DR1 1555 1.365 1.857 -0.339 5.074
DR2 2872 1.623 2.059 -0.348 5.188 DR2 1331 1.847 2.136 -0.348 5.188 DR2 1541 1.430 1.971 -0.348 5.188
DR3 2902 0.137 0.166 -0.110 0.487 DR3 1350 0.162 0.176 -0.110 0.487 DR3 1552 0.116 0.155 -0.110 0.487
DR4 2891 0.022 0.036 -0.062 0.114 DR4 1345 0.029 0.038 -0.062 0.114 DR4 1546 0.016 0.032 -0.062 0.114
DR5 2292 -0.001 0.028 -0.061 0.108 DR5 1071 0.002 0.031 -0.061 0.108 DR5 1221 -0.004 0.025 -0.061 0.108
DISCRATE 2190 0.048 0.753 -1.580 2.407 DISCRATE 1010 0.196 0.795 -1.580 2.407 DISCRATE 1180 -0.079 0.691 -1.580 2.407
HYPERBOL 2844 0.587 0.492 0 1 HYPERBOL 1317 0.547 0.498 0 1 HYPERBOL 1527 0.622 0.485 0 1
SIGN 2249 0.914 0.280 0 1 SIGN 1046 0.922 0.269 0 1 SIGN 1203 0.908 0.290 0 1
PROCR 3112 3.260 1.162 1 5 PROCR 1449 3.467 1.124 1 5 PROCR 1663 3.079 1.165 1 5
NAIVE 2962 1.120 1.201 -2 4 NAIVE 1348 1.165 1.204 -2 4 NAIVE 1614 1.083 1.198 -2 4
2008 2008 2008
Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax
DR1 3761 1.561 1.952 -0.339 5.041 DR1 1761 1.819 2.040 -0.339 5.041 DR1 2000 1.334 1.842 -0.339 5.041
DR2 3765 1.515 1.941 -0.341 5.017 DR2 1762 1.752 2.043 -0.341 5.017 DR2 2003 1.307 1.822 -0.341 5.017
DR3 3765 0.136 0.166 -0.110 0.487 DR3 1760 0.157 0.176 -0.110 0.487 DR3 2005 0.117 0.155 -0.110 0.487
DR4 3756 0.022 0.036 -0.062 0.114 DR4 1757 0.028 0.039 -0.062 0.114 DR4 1999 0.018 0.033 -0.062 0.114
DR5 3103 -0.002 0.027 -0.061 0.108 DR5 1481 0.000 0.030 -0.061 0.108 DR5 1622 -0.005 0.024 -0.061 0.108
DISCRATE 2949 0.045 0.737 -1.576 2.450 DISCRATE 1416 0.173 0.781 -1.576 2.450 DISCRATE 1533 -0.074 0.674 -1.576 2.450
HYPERBOL 3689 0.860 0.347 0 1 HYPERBOL 1729 0.855 0.352 0 1 HYPERBOL 1960 0.864 0.343 0 1
SIGN 3050 0.910 0.287 0 1 SIGN 1456 0.913 0.282 0 1 SIGN 1594 0.907 0.291 0 1
PROCR 4005 3.248 1.205 1 5 PROCR 1872 3.450 1.171 1 5 PROCR 2133 3.072 1.208 1 5
NAIVE 3763 1.129 1.219 -2 4 NAIVE 1711 1.148 1.208 -2 4 NAIVE 2052 1.112 1.228 -2 4
Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax
DR1 12847 1.704 2.148 -0.369 5.724 DR1 6038 1.949 2.227 -0.369 5.724 DR1 6809 1.488 2.052 -0.369 5.724
DR2 12869 1.708 2.206 -0.373 5.742 DR2 6039 1.940 2.294 -0.373 5.742 DR2 6830 1.503 2.104 -0.373 5.742
DR3 12932 0.143 0.177 -0.121 0.512 DR3 6085 0.165 0.185 -0.121 0.512 DR3 6847 0.123 0.167 -0.121 0.512
DR4 12893 0.023 0.039 -0.065 0.118 DR4 6070 0.029 0.041 -0.065 0.118 DR4 6823 0.017 0.036 -0.065 0.118
DR5 10638 -0.005 0.036 -0.073 0.117 DR5 5054 -0.002 0.038 -0.073 0.117 DR5 5584 -0.007 0.033 -0.073 0.117
DISCRATE 10125 0.042 0.718 -1.580 2.450 DISCRATE 4799 0.165 0.754 -1.580 2.450 DISCRATE 5326 -0.069 0.665 -1.580 2.450
HYPERBOL 12639 0.673 0.469 0 1 HYPERBOL 5928 0.645 0.478 0 1 HYPERBOL 6711 0.698 0.459 0 1
SIGN 10450 0.903 0.296 0 1 SIGN 4961 0.905 0.293 0 1 SIGN 5489 0.901 0.299 0 1
PROCR 13827 3.262 1.184 1 5 PROCR 6483 3.471 1.147 1 5 PROCR 7344 3.077 1.186 1 5
NAIVE 14156 1.111 1.202 -2 4 NAIVE 6377 1.149 1.208 -2 4 NAIVE 7779 1.080 1.197 -2 4
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Appendix B: Correlation coefficients of time discounting variables with SMOKING
2005 2006
DISCRATE 0.094 *** 0.053 * 0.056 * DISCRATE 0.127 *** 0.091 *** 0.029
(0.000) (0.087) (0.057) (0.000) (0.001) (0.271)
HYPERBOL -0.044 ** -0.020 -0.047 * HYPERBOL -0.069 *** -0.055 ** -0.013
(0.024) (0.474) (0.078) (0.000) (0.027) (0.591)
SIGN -0.036 * -0.043 -0.040 SIGN -0.025 -0.033 -0.017
(0.090) (0.156) (0.171) (0.189) (0.228) (0.515)
PROCR 0.140 *** 0.080 *** 0.100 *** PROCR 0.135 *** 0.096 *** 0.064 ***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
NAIVE 0.087 *** 0.080 ** 0.101 *** NAIVE 0.062 *** 0.057 ** 0.060 **
(0.000) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.037) (0.015)
2007 2008
DISCRATE 0.140 *** 0.100 *** 0.056 * DISCRATE 0.105 *** 0.062 ** 0.040
(0.000) (0.002) (0.056) (0.000) (0.021) (0.120)
HYPERBOL -0.074 *** -0.065 ** -0.028 HYPERBOL 0.042 ** 0.052 ** 0.056 **
(0.000) (0.018) (0.282) (0.012) (0.033) (0.014)
SIGN -0.040 * -0.070 ** -0.035 SIGN 0.004 0.003 -0.006
(0.062) (0.025) (0.233) (0.842) (0.914) (0.799)
PROCR 0.132 *** 0.103 *** 0.053 ** PROCR 0.095 *** 0.059 ** 0.027
(0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.011) (0.221)
NAIVE 0.069 *** 0.073 *** 0.055 ** NAIVE 0.042 ** 0.048 ** 0.031
(0.000) (0.008) (0.029) (0.010) (0.046) (0.166)
Pooled
DISCRATE 0.116 *** 0.075 *** 0.045 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
HYPERBOL -0.048 *** -0.039 *** -0.015
(0.000) (0.003) (0.219)
SIGN -0.024 ** -0.035 ** -0.024 *
(0.014) (0.015) (0.078)
PROCR 0.124 *** 0.084 *** 0.059 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NAIVE 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.057 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The tables show the correlation coefficients of cigarette consumption with time discounting variables. Samples include nonsmokers. 
P-values are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Male
Female
Female All
FemaleAll
All
All
M ale
SM OKING
Female
Female
SMOKINGSM OKING
SM OKING SMOKING
All Male
M ale
M ale
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Appendix C(a): Summary statistics of SMOKING and control variables (All samples)
2005
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax
SMOKING 2972 6.502 11.971 0 46.622
SMOKING>0 898 21.517 12.296 2.739 46.622
MALE 2987 0.470 0.499 0 1
UNIV 2893 0.204 0.403 0 1
RISKAV 2941 50.478 20.489 0 100
INCOME 2361 223.208 164.655 11.667 1500
AGE 2987 49.077 12.962 21 71
CHILD 2939 0.806 0.395 0 1
2006
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax
SMOKING 3746 6.226 11.679 0 46.286
SMOKING>0 1066 21.879 11.697 2.767 46.286
MALE 3763 0.471 0.499 0 1
UNIV 3632 0.211 0.408 0 1
RISKAV 3690 50.063 20.196 0 100
INCOME 3085 220.669 176.196 11.667 1700
AGE 3763 49.229 13.111 19 72
CHILD 3679 0.809 0.393 0 1
2007
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax
SMOKING 3084 5.873 11.294 0 45.619
SMOKING>0 830 21.820 11.222 2.710 45.619
MALE 3112 0.466 0.499 0 1
UNIV 3029 0.212 0.409 0 1
RISKAV 3063 50.250 20.057 0 100
INCOME 2633 224.453 179.273 17.500 3000
AGE 3112 50.441 12.849 20 73
CHILD 3069 0.824 0.381 0 1
2008
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax
SMOKING 4001 5.238 10.724 0 45.825
SMOKING>0 1004 20.873 11.488 2.734 45.825
MALE 4018 0.468 0.499 0 1
UNIV 3900 0.239 0.427 0 1
RISKAV 3960 49.944 20.112 0 100
INCOME 3529 225.837 177.167 7.000 1700
AGE 4018 49.981 13.205 20 74
CHILD 3952 0.808 0.394 0 1
Pooled
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax
SMOKING 13803 5.920 11.398 0 46.622
SMOKING>0 3798 21.515 11.688 2.710 46.622
MALE 13880 0.469 0.499 0 1
UNIV 13454 0.218 0.413 0 1
RISKAV 13654 50.160 20.203 0 100
INCOME 11608 223.615 174.910 7.000 3000
AGE 13880 49.686 13.058 19 74
CHILD 13639 0.811 0.391 0 1
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Appendix C(b): Summary statistics of SMOKING and control variables (male samples)
2005
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 1395 11.373 14.728 0 46.622
SM OKING>0 648 24.483 12.077 2.753 46.622
UNIV 1364 0.297 0.457 0 1
RISKAV 1385 49.558 21.259 0 100
INCOME 1141 231.022 173.059 14 1500
AGE 1403 50.159 12.875 21 71
CHILD 1375 0.774 0.419 0 1
2006
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 1763 10.937 14.378 0 46.286
SM OKING>0 795 24.253 11.635 2.767 46.286
UNIV 1715 0.307 0.461 0 1
RISKAV 1734 49.156 21.141 0 100
INCOME 1500 231.259 187.844 11.667 1700
AGE 1774 50.231 13.045 19 72
CHILD 1729 0.782 0.413 0 1
2007
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 1437 10.218 13.703 0 45.619
SM OKING>0 618 23.760 10.712 2.797 45.619
UNIV 1412 0.311 0.463 0 1
RISKAV 1426 49.471 20.720 0 100
INCOME 1266 232.342 190.234 17.500 3000
AGE 1449 51.602 12.756 21 73
CHILD 1421 0.806 0.395 0 1
2008
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 1870 9.172 13.394 0 45.825
SM OKING>0 734 23.368 11.193 2.774 45.825
UNIV 1825 0.351 0.477 0 1
RISKAV 1849 49.063 20.983 0 100
INCOME 1700 229.309 176.042 7.000 1700
AGE 1879 51.090 13.093 20 74
CHILD 1838 0.782 0.413 0 1
Pooled
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 6465 10.361 14.051 0 46.622
SM OKING>0 2795 23.965 11.430 2.753 46.622
UNIV 6316 0.318 0.466 0 1
RISKAV 6394 49.286 21.024 0 100
INCOME 5607 230.864 181.893 7.000 3000
AGE 6505 50.769 12.969 19 74
CHILD 6363 0.786 0.410 0 1
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Appendix C(c): Summary statistics of SMOKING and control variables (female samples)
2005
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 1577 2.193 6.223 0 43.060
SM OKING>0 250 13.832 9.136 2.739 43.060
UNIV 1529 0.122 0.327 0 1
RISKAV 1556 51.298 19.749 0 100
INCOME 1220 215.900 156.104 11.667 1500
AGE 1584 48.119 12.969 21 71
CHILD 1564 0.834 0.372 0 1
2006
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 1983 2.038 6.054 0 42.996
SM OKING>0 271 14.916 8.734 2.777 42.996
UNIV 1917 0.125 0.331 0 1
RISKAV 1956 50.866 19.289 0 100
INCOME 1585 210.647 163.845 11.667 1500
AGE 1989 48.335 13.108 19 72
CHILD 1950 0.833 0.373 0 1
2007
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 1647 2.081 6.649 0 44.248
SM OKING>0 212 16.166 10.777 2.710 44.248
UNIV 1617 0.126 0.332 0 1
RISKAV 1637 50.929 19.442 0 100
INCOME 1367 217.147 168.228 17.500 1700
AGE 1663 49.428 12.848 20 73
CHILD 1648 0.839 0.368 0 1
2008
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 2131 1.785 5.748 0 43.201
SM OKING>0 270 14.092 9.355 2.734 43.201
UNIV 2075 0.142 0.349 0 1
RISKAV 2111 50.715 19.288 0 100
INCOME 1829 222.610 178.193 10.000 1700
AGE 2139 49.006 13.229 20 74
CHILD 2114 0.832 0.374 0 1
Pooled
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SM OKING 7338 2.008 6.144 0 44.248
SM OKING>0 1003 14.688 9.487 2.710 44.248
UNIV 7138 0.129 0.336 0 1
RISKAV 7260 50.929 19.420 0 100
INCOME 6001 216.842 167.856 10.000 1700
AGE 7375 48.730 13.062 19 74
CHILD 7276 0.834 0.372 0 1
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Appendix D: Correlations between S MOKING and control variables
2005 2006
MALE 0.383 *** M ALE 0.380 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
UNIV -0.012 -0.127 *** -0.052 ** UNIV -0.021 -0.136 *** -0.075 ***
(0.506) (0.000) (0.044) (0.202) (0.000) (0.001)
RISKAV -0.109 *** -0.137 *** -0.041 RISKAV -0.100 *** -0.112 *** -0.059 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
INCOME 0.041 ** 0.060 ** -0.051 * INCOME -0.001 -0.016 -0.047 *
(0.047) (0.043) (0.078) (0.967) (0.536) (0.061)
AGE -0.039 ** -0.060 ** -0.124 *** AGE -0.033 ** -0.052 ** -0.112 ***
(0.033) (0.025) (0.000) (0.044) (0.029) (0.000)
CHILD -(0.055) *** -(0.023) -(0.047) * CHILD -(0.043) *** -(0.008) -(0.050) **
(0.003) (0.393) (0.067) (0.009) (0.734) (0.028)
2007 2008
MALE 0.360 *** M ALE 0.344 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
UNIV -0.019 -0.130 *** -0.065 *** UNIV -0.010 -0.118 *** -0.072 ***
(0.305) (0.000) (0.009) (0.528) (0.000) (0.001)
RISKAV -0.091 *** -0.102 *** -0.059 ** RISKAV -0.099 *** -0.099 *** -0.087 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INCOME -0.003 -0.010 -0.037 INCOME -0.013 -0.016 -0.035
(0.879) (0.718) (0.175) (0.446) (0.515) (0.140)
AGE -0.037 ** -0.066 ** -0.097 *** AGE -0.025 -0.042 * -0.096 ***
(0.040) (0.013) (0.000) (0.122) (0.071) (0.000)
CHILD -(0.029) (0.002) -(0.047) * CHILD -(0.003) (0.038) -(0.017)
(0.114) (0.940) (0.056) (0.868) (0.102) (0.442)
Pooled
MALE 0.366 ***
(0.000)
UNIV -0.017 ** -0.130 *** -0.067 ***
(0.050) (0.000) (0.000)
RISKAV -0.099 *** -0.111 *** -0.062 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INCOME 0.003 0.001 -0.042 ***
(0.719) (0.927) (0.001)
AGE -0.034 *** -0.056 *** -0.107 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CHILD -(0.032) *** (0.003) -(0.039) ***
(0.000) (0.820) (0.001)
Notes: The tables show the correlation coefficients of cigarette consumption with control variables. Samples include nonsmokers. 
P-values are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
SMOKING
All Male Female
SMOKING SMOKING
All Male Female All Male Female
SMOKING SMOKING
All Male Female All Male Female
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Appendix E: Tax hikes, smoking moderation, and increasing rates of tax revenue
Model (1): The marginal effect of tax= -0.416  
before tax hikes
Cigarette price per pack
JPY 300
(USD 2.80)
JPY 500
(USD 4.67)
JPY 700
(USD 6.53)
JPY 1000
(USD 9.33)
?TAX per cigarette JPY 0
(USD 0)
JPY 10
(USD 0.09)
JPY 20
(USD 0.19)
JPY 35
(USD 0.33)
Averaged cigarette consumption 20.873 18.880 14.725 13.956
Smoking rates 25.1% 22.4% 22.4% 15.6%
Smoking cessation rates for smokers 0.0% 10.7% 10.7% 37.8%
Increasing rates of revenues 0.0% 73.2% 107.2% 107.9%
Model (2): The marginal effect of tax= -0.423  
before tax hikes
Cigarette price per pack
JPY 300
(USD 2.80)
JPY 500
(USD 4.67)
JPY 700
(USD 6.53)
JPY 1000
(USD 9.33)
?TAX per cigarette JPY 0
(USD 0)
JPY 10
(USD 0.09)
JPY 20
(USD 0.19)
JPY 35
(USD 0.33)
Averaged cigarette consumption 20.873 18.807 14.579 13.701
Smoking rates 25.1% 22.4% 22.4% 15.6%
Smoking cessation rates for smokers 0.0% 10.7% 10.7% 37.8%
Increasing rates of revenues 0.0% 72.6% 105.1% 104.1%
Model (3): The marginal effect of tax= -0.315
before tax hikes
Cigarette price per pack
JPY 300
(USD 2.80)
JPY 500
(USD 4.67)
JPY 700
(USD 6.53)
JPY 1000
(USD 9.33)
?TAX per cigarette JPY 0
(USD 0)
JPY 10
(USD 0.09)
JPY 20
(USD 0.19)
JPY 35
(USD 0.33)
Averaged cigarette consumption 20.873 19.890 16.745 17.491
Smoking rates 25.1% 22.4% 22.4% 15.6%
Smoking cessation rates for smokers 0.0% 10.7% 10.7% 37.8%
Increasing rates of revenues 0.0% 82.5% 135.6% 160.5%
after tax hikes
after tax hikes
after tax hikes
Notes: This tabels show the predicted smoking status and increasing rates of government's revenues responding to tax
hikes by JPY 10, 20, and 35 (around USD 0.09, 0.19, and 0.33) per cigarette. Estimated coefficients of TAX in model (1),
(2), and (3) for full samples are used for the predictions, respectively. The marginal effects are measured around mean
values of smokers in 2008. The rows of "Cigarette price per pack" show the hypothetical prices per 20-cigarette pack
after tax hikes calculated by (20*?TAX per cigarette). The rows of "?TAX per cigarette" show the increased rates of
tax per cigarette. The rows of "Averaged cigarette consumption", "Smoking rates", and "Smoking cessation rates for
smokers" show the resulting status of cigarette consumption after tax hikes. The rows of "Increasing rates of revenues"
show the net increasing rates of government's revenues by hiking cigarette tax.
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   Appendix F: Tax hikes and the increasing rates of tax revenue
Notes: This figures show the predicted increasing rates of government's revenues responding to tax hikes. The horizonal
axes indicate the increased rates of tax per cigarette. The vertical axes indicate the net increasing rates of government's
revenues by hiking cigarette tax in JPY terms. The estimated coefficients of TAX in model (1), (2), and (3) for full
samples are used for the predictions, respectively. The marginal effects are measured around mean values of smokers in
2008.
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Panel (B): The marginal effect of TAX= -0.423 (Model (2))
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Panel (C): The marginal effect of TAX= -0.315 (Model (3))
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